
Institutional Bottlenecks and Optimization Pathways for the Redevelopment of Inefficient Land Use—A Case Study of the Transformation of Village-Level Industrial Parks in Shunde District, Guangdong Province

Jinyou Guo*

Guangdong Provincial Committee Reform Office, Guangzhou 510082, Guangdong, China

**Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.*

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Abstract: The redevelopment of inefficient land use is a crucial pathway to breaking land resource bottlenecks, promoting industrial transformation and upgrading, and achieving high-quality economic development. Counties (county-level cities and districts), the core implementation level for this work, directly face complex issues including interest adjustment, resource allocation and institutional constraints, and their implementation effectiveness determines whether relevant policies can be truly put into practice. Taking Shunde District of Guangdong Province, a pilot zone for institutional mechanism reform and innovation for high-quality development, as the core case and combining the Pearl River Delta's practice of inefficient land use redevelopment, this paper constructs an analytical framework of "Policy Authorization - Organizational Advancement - Resource Guarantee - Interest Coordination". It systematically analyzes the major institutional bottlenecks and their generative mechanisms in county-level inefficient land use redevelopment in China. The study finds prominent problems: inadequate adaptability of planning policies, difficulties in controlling redevelopment costs, poor mechanisms for activating collective land, and ambiguous identification criteria for inefficient land use, whose root causes lie in insufficient vertical authorization, poor tiao-kuai coordination, lagging resource allocation, and an imperfect interest coordination mechanism. Shunde's practice shows that county-level inefficient land use redevelopment can only shift from localized breakthroughs to systematic advancement under the conditions of provincial-level policy authorization, top leaders' overall coordination, implementation by institutionalized special task forces, and equal emphasis on risk control and interest sharing. Based on this, the paper proposes optimization pathways from four dimensions: provincial-level policy support, land system reform, supporting policy innovation, and social risk management and control, aiming to provide replicable and promotable practical experience for China's county-level inefficient land use redevelopment and high-quality development.

Keywords: Redevelopment of inefficient land use; Transformation of village-level industrial parks; High-quality development; County governance; Shunde District

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1. Problem Statement and Literature Review

1.1. Problem Statement

The report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China clearly stated that China's economy has shifted from high-speed growth to high-quality development, making high-quality development the core guiding principle for new-era economic and social development. As a core production factor for economic development, land use efficiency directly determines the quality of high-quality development. However, the industrial development model of "every village starting industries and every household running factories" formed since reform and opening up has given rise to a large number of industrial land plots with scattered layout, backward production capacity and inefficient use, becoming a key bottleneck restricting the industrial transformation and upgrading of China's eastern coastal areas. In 2016, the former Ministry of Land and Resources issued the Guiding Opinions (Trial) on Further Promoting the Redevelopment of Urban Inefficient Land Use, providing a policy basis for local practices, and inefficient land use redevelopment has officially become a core measure for all regions to activate stock land and break development space constraints^[1].

As a frontier of China's reform and opening up, the Pearl River Delta is particularly plagued by inefficient land use caused by village-level industrial parks. Statistics show 3,853 village-level industrial parks in the nine cities of the Pearl River Delta, covering 976 square kilometers, and the contradiction between low land use efficiency and the land demand for high-quality industrial development has become increasingly prominent. Shunde District of Foshan City, one of the "Four Little Tigers of Guangdong", is a major Pearl River Delta manufacturing hub and Guangdong's first pilot zone for institutional mechanism reform and innovation for high-quality development. Its 382 village-level industrial parks account for 70% of the district's developed industrial land area but only contribute 27% of the output value and 4.3% of the tax revenue, making inefficient land use the main contradiction restricting its high-quality development. Since 2018, Shunde has taken village-level industrial park transformation as a breakthrough to promote inefficient land use redevelopment, achieving remarkable phased results, but also encountering intractable county-level institutional bottlenecks in planning, cost, land management and land identification.

Counties (county-level cities and districts) are the key level for the implementation of inefficient land use redevelopment policies, directly undertaking policy implementation, interest coordination and project advancement. The problems they face are typical and universal. Taking Shunde's village-level industrial park transformation as the core case, this paper attempts to answer two core questions: First, what universal institutional bottlenecks are faced in promoting county-level inefficient land use redevelopment? Second, how has Shunde broken through some institutional bottlenecks, and what enlightenment does its experience provide for county-level inefficient land use redevelopment across the country? This research enriches the study of county-level practice in inefficient land use redevelopment and provides practical reference for breaking the institutional constraints of county-level inefficient land use redevelopment in China^[2].

1.2. Literature Review

Domestic academic research on inefficient land use redevelopment has yielded rich results, mainly focusing on three aspects: First, research on practical necessity and strategic significance. Scholars generally believe it is an inevitable path to break land resource bottlenecks, promote industrial transformation and upgrading, and achieve high-quality economic development; in eastern coastal areas, stock inefficient land redevelopment has become the main direction of land use. Second, research on models and practical experience. Most studies take the Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta and other regions as objects, summarize government-led, market-led and government-enterprise cooperation models, and analyze local practical experience in policy innovation and mechanism exploration. Third, research on problems and countermeasures. Scholars point out China's practice is faced with planning constraints, high costs, complex land ownership, difficult interest coordination and other problems, and put forward targeted countermeasures from policy improvement, mechanism innovation and interest coordination dimensions.

Existing research provides important inspiration but has three deficiencies: First, the research perspective is

relatively macro, lacking systematic county-level analysis. Most studies discuss policies and mechanisms from national and provincial levels, few take counties (county-level cities and districts) as an independent analytical level, and fail to fully reveal the specific bottlenecks and their generative mechanisms in county-level inefficient land use redevelopment. Second, the research content focuses on experience summary, lacking theoretical framework support. Most studies sort out local experience but fail to construct a systematic analytical framework for in-depth analysis of problems and mechanisms. Third, the research focuses on single problems, lacking systematic consideration. Most studies focus on planning, cost, land and other individual issues, and fail to analyze systematic bottlenecks from the comprehensive perspective of policy authorization, organizational advancement, resource guarantee and interest coordination^[3].

Based on this, taking Shunde's village-level industrial park transformation as the core case, this paper constructs the analytical framework of "Policy Authorization - Organizational Advancement - Resource Guarantee - Interest Coordination", systematically analyzes the institutional bottlenecks and their generative mechanisms of county-level inefficient land use redevelopment, summarizes Shunde's practical experience and puts forward optimization pathways, attempting to make up for the deficiencies of existing research.

2. Analytical Framework, Research Methods and Case Description

2.1. Analytical Framework: Policy Authorization - Organizational Advancement - Resource Guarantee - Interest Coordination

County-level inefficient land use redevelopment is not a simple project advancement issue, but a complex process involving policy authorization, organizational coordination, resource matching and interest game, and its effectiveness depends on the coordinated efforts of four dimensions:

First, Policy Authorization. Inefficient land use redevelopment is essentially an adjustment and breakthrough of the existing land use system, planning management system and tax system. Whether the county level has sufficient policy pilot rights, planning adjustment rights and factor disposal rights determines whether the redevelopment can be truly launched. Insufficient higher-level authorization, lengthy approval chains and lagging policy rules will limit county-level practice to superficial adjustments, making systematic breakthroughs difficult.

Second, Organizational Advancement. The redevelopment involves multiple departments including natural resources, development and reform, industry and information technology, housing and urban-rural development, and taxation, as well as district, town and village-level subjects, being a typical cross-departmental, cross-level and cross-field systematic project. Whether the county level has formed an organizational mechanism with unified Party committee leadership, top leader overall coordination, institutionalized special task force implementation and multi-department collaboration determines whether it can break through departmental segmentation, tiao-kuai contradictions and hierarchical barriers to achieve efficient advancement.

Third, Resource Guarantee. The redevelopment requires substantial resource support such as funds, human resources and land indicators. The entire process from land consolidation, factory demolition to reclamation and greening, and new factory construction needs continuous resource input. Whether the county level has sufficient financial funds, a professional cadre team and supporting land indicators determines whether it can overcome fund shortage, insufficient human resources, indicator constraints and other problems to achieve sustainable advancement.

Fourth, Interest Coordination. The redevelopment directly touches the interests of the government, village collectives, enterprises, villagers and other subjects, being a profound interest adjustment. Whether the county level has established a scientific and reasonable interest distribution mechanism, communication and consultation mechanism and rights protection mechanism determines whether it can gather social consensus, resolve interest contradictions and achieve steady and orderly advancement^[4].

This framework places the complex problems of county-level inefficient land use redevelopment under a unified logic. The four dimensions are relatively independent and mutually embedded: policy authorization is the premise defining

the redevelopment boundary; organizational advancement is the key determining efficiency; resource guarantee is the foundation supporting capacity; interest coordination is the guarantee maintaining stability. The coordinated efforts of the four dimensions are the core conditions for the systematic advancement of county-level inefficient land use redevelopment.

2.2. Research Methods

This paper adopts a combination of case study and policy text analysis, supplemented by field research. First, taking Shunde District as the core case, it sorts out its practical process, phased achievements and experience in promoting inefficient land use redevelopment through village-level industrial park transformation, and analyzes the institutional bottlenecks it faces. Second, it systematically analyzes the policy texts of the central, Guangdong provincial and Foshan municipal governments on inefficient land use redevelopment, village-level industrial park transformation and land system reform, sorts out the policy evolution context, and reveals the policy environment and institutional constraints of county-level inefficient land use redevelopment. Third, combined with field research data from the Reform Office of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee and the Reform Office of the Shunde District Party Committee, including town and street forums, enterprise interviews and village visits, it enhances the research's reality and pertinence^[5].

2.3. Case Description: Why Choose Shunde

Shunde is selected as the core case mainly for three reasons: First, Typicality. As a major Pearl River Delta manufacturing hub, its inefficient land use problem caused by village-level industrial parks is a typical microcosm of the Pearl River Delta and even China's eastern coastal areas, and the institutional bottlenecks in planning, cost, land and identification it faces are also common problems in county-level inefficient land use redevelopment. Second, Representativeness. As Guangdong's first pilot zone for institutional mechanism reform and innovation for high-quality development, Shunde has obtained 11 provincial-level policy authorizations involving village-level industrial park transformation, being a forerunner in China's county-level inefficient land use redevelopment, and its reform practice has distinct representativeness. Third, Demonstrativeness. Since 2018, Shunde has listed village-level industrial park transformation as a "top priority project", and formed a series of replicable and promotable practical experience in policy innovation, organizational advancement, model exploration and interest coordination. Its reform achievements have been highly recognized by national and provincial levels, having important demonstration significance.

3. Practical Process and Phased Achievements of the Redevelopment of Inefficient Land Use in Shunde District

3.1. Practical Process

2018 was the starting year of Shunde's inefficient land use redevelopment. The Deep Reform Leading Group of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee approved the construction of Shunde's pilot zone for institutional mechanism reform and innovation for high-quality development, listing village-level industrial park transformation as the core reform task, and Shunde officially launched the transformation work. Facing multiple resistances such as cadres' fear of difficulties, villagers' concerns and enterprises' resistance, the whole district unified thinking and gathered consensus, laying a foundation for reform advancement^[6].

2019 was the tackling year. The Deep Reform Commission of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee issued the pilot zone implementation plan, endowing Shunde with 11 provincial-level policy supports. Shunde set higher self-imposed transformation goals, established a "top leader project" promotion mechanism, set up an institutionalized special task force, innovated diversified transformation models, and issued a series of supporting policies. The village-level industrial park transformation achieved comprehensive tackling across the region, and reform results gradually emerged.

Since then, Shunde has entered a stage of systematic advancement in inefficient land use redevelopment. Taking village-level industrial park transformation as the starting point, it comprehensively promoted industrial upgrading,

urban construction, rural revitalization and grassroots governance, deeply integrating inefficient land use redevelopment with high-quality development, and achieving the comprehensive effect of “one transformation promoting multiple improvements”, becoming a national benchmark for county-level inefficient land use redevelopment ^[7].

3.2. Phased Achievements

3.2.1. Comprehensive Reform Consensus Gathered, Forming a Pattern of Comprehensive Tackling

In the early stage of transformation, Shunde faced multiple doubts from cadres, villagers and enterprises. Through top leaders’ personal deployment and on-site promotion, reform pressure was transmitted at all levels. Meanwhile, policy publicity and typical demonstration were strengthened, enabling cadres and villagers to see reform dividends and gradually eliminate doubts and wait-and-see attitudes. In July 2019, the contiguous transformation projects of Xiantang in Longjiang and Guanghua in Xingtan passed the village collective vote with an absolute support rate, becoming a typical microcosm of comprehensive tackling. The whole district formed a good reform atmosphere where cadres dare to act, villagers support and enterprises participate.

3.2.2. Transformation Tasks Efficiently Advanced, Achieving Remarkable Substantial Results

As of July 15, 2019, among Shunde’s 382 village-level industrial parks, 161 projects in 109 parks had launched transformation, and 77 parks had started demolition; a total of 9,892 mu of land consolidation, 805 mu of reclamation and greening, and 4.24 million square meters of new factory buildings were completed, and 2,988 backward and high-risk enterprises were closed and eliminated, far exceeding the total amount of the “Three Olds” (old towns, old factories, old villages) transformation from 2009 to 2017. In 2019, Shunde was commended by a circular of the General Office of the State Council for its remarkable achievements in economical and intensive land use, and was awarded 2,500 mu of separate land planning indicators, becoming a model of “Land-Saving China”.

3.2.3. Economic Development Grew Against the Trend, with Initial High-Quality Development Achievements

Under the complex domestic and international economic situation in the first half of 2019, Shunde promoted industrial upgrading through inefficient land use redevelopment, achieving economic growth against the trend: the regional GDP reached 157.492 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 7.1%; the total industrial output value of above-scale industrial enterprises reached 345.244 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 7.3%; industrial investment increased by 13.1%, and total import and export volume increased by 9.5%. Inefficient land use redevelopment injected strong impetus into Shunde’s high-quality economic development, verifying the supporting role of activating stock land for industrial transformation and upgrading.

3.2.4. Policy System Gradually Improved, Forming Replicable Experience and Models

Shunde issued 41 supporting policy documents covering land approval, project construction declaration, industrial development, approval reform and other links; it innovatively refined six transformation models such as government account receivable storage and direct government expropriation, solving the problems of complex land ownership and difficult interest balance; it promoted approval system reform, realizing industrial project approval within 11 working days, leading the country in approval efficiency, and forming a series of replicable and promotable practical experience ^[8].

4. Institutional Bottlenecks in County-Level Inefficient Land Use Redevelopment - Observations Based on Shunde

Although Shunde has achieved remarkable results in inefficient land use redevelopment, as a county-level region, it still faces a series of insurmountable institutional bottlenecks in the promotion process. These bottlenecks not only restrict the speed and effectiveness of Shunde’s practice, but also are common problems in county-level inefficient land

use redevelopment across the country, mainly concentrated in four aspects, whose root causes point to deep-seated contradictions in the four dimensions of policy authorization, organizational advancement, resource guarantee and interest coordination.

4.1. Inadequate Adaptability of Planning Policies, Mismatch Between Policy Authorization and Practical Demands

Planning policies are important constraints on inefficient land use redevelopment. The planning policy bottlenecks faced by Shunde are essentially due to insufficient provincial-level policy authorization and over-centralization of planning adjustment rights. First, the approval efficiency of regulatory detailed plan adjustment is low. Shunde's independent approval rights for regulatory detailed plans were later transferred to Foshan City, and a large number of transformation projects involve plan revision with a 6-8 month approval process, seriously affecting project progress. Second, there is a conflict between new industries and planning control lines. Blue lines, green lines, brown lines and other control lines impose overly strict control on industrial land, only allowing industrial or warehousing construction, which cannot meet the diversified development needs of new industries and new business forms, increasing park investment attraction difficulty. Third, there are excessive controls on enterprise relocation. High-quality enterprises need to go through multiple environmental protection and fire protection approvals for temporary relocation, with complex processes and long time consumption. Some enterprises even cannot reapply for procedures due to environmental protection indicators, affecting their transformation enthusiasm^[9].

4.2. Difficulties in Controlling Redevelopment Costs, Mismatch Between Resource Guarantee and Reform Tasks

Excessively high redevelopment costs are a prominent problem in county-level inefficient land use redevelopment. The cost bottlenecks faced by Shunde are essentially due to insufficient county-level resource guarantee capacity and mismatched resource support with reform tasks. First, the tax burden is high and there is double taxation. In collective land to state-owned land transformation projects, supporting property right transfer from the winning bidder to the village collective incurs two tax burdens, increasing additional project costs. Second, there are district-level administrative risks in tax treatment. Guangdong has endowed Shunde with relevant tax preferential policies but no clear operational rules, and the local tax department's exploratory practices lack provincial guidance, imposing large administrative risks on the local government. Third, the early capital investment pressure is huge. Land consolidation and factory demolition rely mainly on district and town financial resources and state-owned assets, and the limited grassroots financial strength is difficult to support large-scale transformation work.

4.3. Poor Mechanisms for Activating Collective Construction Land, Imbalance Between Tiao-Kuai Coordination and Factor Allocation

Collective construction land is the main carrier of county-level inefficient land use, and its poor activation is the core bottleneck in Shunde's practice, essentially due to tiao-kuai segmentation, unbalanced factor allocation between collective and state-owned land, and insufficient county-level land system innovation autonomy. First, properties built on collective construction land cannot be subdivided. Factories on collectively transferred construction land lack subdivision certificate issuance, leading to financing difficulties for investors and enterprises, even affecting listing plans and restricting industrial agglomeration. Second, the connection mechanism between collective and state-owned construction land is poor. Concentrated construction of villagers' community apartments cannot use state-owned land, leading to the "small property rights" problem and financing/property right protection difficulties; different nature construction land cannot be mixed supplied and transferred, hindering contiguous development and reducing land use efficiency. Third, the approval time limit for collective land to state-owned land conversion is long. The provincial-level approval takes nearly 4 months, becoming an important project promotion bottleneck^[10].

4.4. Ambiguous Identification Criteria for Inefficient Land Use, Imperfect Interest Coordination and Supervision Mechanisms

The identification of inefficient land use is the premise of its redevelopment. The ambiguous identification criteria are the basic bottleneck in Shunde's practice, essentially due to the lack of unified national identification criteria and supervision mechanisms, and difficult multi-department interest coordination at the county level. First, the identification criteria lack uniformity. The start-up date and investment amount of idle land are difficult to confirm, and investment intensity, plot ratio and other indicators fluctuate greatly, with relevant departments lacking unified standards. Second, responsibility definition is difficult to clarify. The formation of some inefficient land use involves both enterprise and government factors such as planning adjustments and inadequate supporting facilities, leading to disposal difficulties. Third, policy implementation lacks operability. The high land idle fee collection standard is unaffordable for most enterprises, making the policy difficult to implement, and the inefficient land use exit mechanism is imperfect.

5. Practical Logic of Shunde in Breaking the Institutional Bottlenecks of Inefficient Land Use Redevelopment

Faced with county-level institutional bottlenecks, Shunde, supported by provincial-level policy authorization, has made efforts from organizational advancement, resource guarantee and interest coordination dimensions, exploring practical paths to break the bottlenecks. Its practical logic provides important enlightenment for county-level regions, reflected in four aspects:

5.1. Provincial-Level Pilot Zone Authorization: The Premise for Institutional Breakthrough

The primary premise for Shunde's breakthrough is the provincial-level authorization as Guangdong's pilot zone for institutional mechanism reform and innovation for high-quality development, becoming a county-level policy innovation "test field". The Deep Reform Commission of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee endowed Shunde with 11 provincial-level policy supports involving village-level industrial park transformation, including intra-district land use plan adjustment and rapid illegal land use investigation, giving Shunde rare county-level policy powers such as planning adjustment and law enforcement rights. For example, Shunde sorted out 8,500 mu of adjustable land scale relying on the relevant policy authorization, solving the planning inconsistency problem of key projects and opening up institutional space for inefficient land use redevelopment ^[11].

5.2. "Top Leader Project": The Core of Efficient Organizational Advancement

To address tiao-kuai segmentation and poor departmental coordination, Shunde listed village-level industrial park transformation as a "top leader project" for district and town Party secretaries, constructing an organizational mechanism with unified Party committee leadership and multi-department collaboration. The district Party secretary personally deployed and promoted the work on the front line, district-level departments and grassroots "fought in the same trench", and ten towns and streets formed a "learning from and competing with each other" tackling pattern. Meanwhile, Shunde established an employment orientation of "encouraging responsibility and advocating hard work", adjusted inactive village cadres and reused promising ones, forging a "Shunde Iron Army" that dares to fight tough battles, effectively breaking departmental and hierarchical barriers and improving reform efficiency.

5.3. Institutionalized Special Task Forces: The Support for Strengthening Resource Guarantee

To address insufficient resource guarantee, Shunde set up the Office of the Leading Group for Village-Level Industrial Park Transformation, realizing institutionalized and regular operation, and tilting human, financial and policy resources to the reform front line. It appointed district-level department deputy directors to be stationed in towns and streets, selected young and middle-aged cadres as village first secretaries, and assigned 100 outstanding cadres to village transformation

offices, providing sufficient human support. It delegated 30 land and resources management powers and 57 planning and construction declaration powers to towns and streets, endowing the grassroots with more reform autonomy. It innovated the approval system with the “1121” reform and joint review meeting mechanism, greatly improving government service efficiency and making up for insufficient resource guarantee with institutional innovation.

5.4. Diversified Models: The Grasp for Multi-Subject Interest Coordination

To address difficult interest coordination, Shunde adheres to the principle of “government promotion, market leadership and harmonious win-win”, refining six diversified transformation models and establishing a scientific interest distribution mechanism, realizing multi-subject interest coordination. The government account receivable storage model returns 98% of land transfer income to the original right holders, and the Baoyong Industrial Zone’s village collective rental income more than doubled after transformation. Shunde adheres to “industrial land for industrial use”, protects villagers’ interests through reclamation and greening and community apartment construction, strengthens policy publicity and consultation, enables all parties to see reform dividends, and realizes steady transformation with zero complaints, zero petitions and zero accidents.

5.5. Systematic Thinking: The Guide for “One Transformation Promoting Multiple Improvements”

Shunde has not limited inefficient land use redevelopment to land activation, but deeply integrated village-level industrial park transformation with industrial upgrading, urban construction, rural revitalization and grassroots governance with systematic thinking, achieving the comprehensive effect of “one transformation promoting multiple improvements”. It introduced high-end manufacturing projects such as the Bozhilin Robot Valley with the vacated space, promoting industrial high-end and intelligent development; improved urban quality and living environment through ecological governance and spatial optimization; fed back reform dividends to villages to promote rural revitalization; strengthened grassroots Party organization construction through the transformation work, consolidating grassroots governance foundation ^[12].

6. Optimization Pathways for County-Level Inefficient Land Use Redevelopment

Shunde’s practice shows that county-level inefficient land use redevelopment needs to break administrative authority and resource constraints, rely on higher-level policy support and institutional innovation, and solve institutional bottlenecks through four-dimensional efforts. Based on Shunde’s experience and common county-level problems, this paper proposes four optimization pathways:

6.1. Increase Provincial-Level Policy Support, Strengthen Policy Authorization and Top-Level Design

The provincial level is the key to breaking county-level institutional bottlenecks. First, set up a provincial-level special coordination group for inefficient land use redevelopment, regularly studying county-level problems and solving planning, land and taxation issues within provincial authority. Second, improve a unified institutional system, formulating provincial unified inefficient land use identification criteria, exit measures and tax policies to solve identification, exit and taxation problems. Third, set up a provincial special support fund to alleviate grassroots financial pressure. Fourth, establish a service account for provincial directly affiliated departments, requiring them to pilot reform measures in county-level pilot zones, optimize approval processes and provide proactive services for non-delegable matters.

6.2. Deepen Land System Reform and Innovation, Solve Collective Land Activation Problems

Land system reform is the core of county-level inefficient land use redevelopment. First, authorize pilot counties and districts to independently adjust plans and approve land, delegating regulatory detailed plan adjustment and collective land conversion approval rights. Second, support mixed development of collective and state-owned construction land, allowing contiguous mixed development and proportional land premium sharing. Third, carry out collective construction

land property subdivision certificate issuance pilots, realizing “same rights and same prices for the same land” to solve financing difficulties. Fourth, support the conversion of villagers’ community apartments from collective to state-owned land, solving the “small property rights” problem and protecting villagers’ legitimate property rights^[13].

6.3. Promote Supporting Policy Innovation, Reduce Redevelopment Costs and Improve Service Efficiency

Supporting policy innovation is the guarantee for county-level inefficient land use redevelopment. First, deepen approval system reform, further delegating powers and realizing “ultra-simplified handling” and “one-stop” approval for enterprise investment projects. Second, explore the agency construction mechanism for supporting projects, converting supporting project land to state-owned nature held by village collectives to avoid double taxation. Third, support industrial planning compatibility and integration, encouraging mixed development of industrial and commercial service land under planning control. Fourth, innovate financial support policies, exploring green financial products such as collective construction land mortgage financing and “village transformation loans” to attract social capital.

6.4. Strengthen Social Risk Management and Control, Improve Interest Coordination and Supervision Mechanisms

Social risk management and control is the bottom line of county-level inefficient land use redevelopment. First, improve the multi-subject interest coordination mechanism, establishing a communication and consultation mechanism and scientifically formulating interest distribution plans to gather social consensus. Second, improve the industrial land post-supply supervision mechanism, establishing a multi-department evaluation system to force enterprises to improve land use efficiency. Third, establish a full-process supervision mechanism for investment attraction projects, clarifying industrial direction and economic indicators to ensure the vacated space is used for high-end industries. Fourth, strengthen the cadre incentive and fault tolerance mechanism, incorporating redevelopment into cadre assessment, refining fault tolerance rules and stimulating grassroots reform enthusiasm^[14].

7. Conclusion

Inefficient land use redevelopment is an inevitable path for counties to promote high-quality economic development. Counties (county-level cities and districts) directly face complex problems in policy authorization, organizational advancement, resource guarantee and interest coordination, and the institutional bottlenecks they face are typical and universal, with root causes in insufficient vertical authorization, poor tiao-kuai coordination, lagging resource allocation and an imperfect interest coordination mechanism.

As Guangdong’s pilot zone for institutional mechanism reform and innovation for high-quality development, Shunde has taken village-level industrial park transformation as a breakthrough to promote inefficient land use redevelopment. Its practical logic shows that provincial-level policy authorization is the premise, top leader-led organizational advancement mechanism is the key, institutionalized special task force-based resource guarantee is the foundation, and multi-win interest coordination mechanism is the guarantee. Through these measures, Shunde has realized the systematic advancement of inefficient land use redevelopment, achieved remarkable phased results, and formed replicable and promotable practical experience.

County-level inefficient land use redevelopment needs to break its own constraints, rely on provincial-level policy support and institutional innovation, and make efforts from provincial-level policy support, land system reform, supporting policy innovation and social risk management and control dimensions. Only by the four-dimensional joint efforts of policy authorization, organizational advancement, resource guarantee and interest coordination can we fundamentally break the institutional bottlenecks, promote the redevelopment from localized breakthroughs to systematic advancement, and provide solid land resource support for county-level high-quality economic development.

Shunde's experience provides a reference for the Pearl River Delta and a replicable "Shunde Model" for China's eastern coastal areas and all county-level regions. In the future, with the improvement of the inefficient land use redevelopment institutional system and the deepening of reform practice, China's counties will gradually break the land resource bottleneck, realize land use efficiency improvement and industrial transformation and upgrading, and lay a solid county foundation for building a great modern socialist country in all respects.

Disclosure statement

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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